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dualistic interactionism underpinning that conclusion. Apparently agreeing with Descartes' early
critics that a nonphysical substance (mind) and a
physical substance (body) could not directly affect
each other, he amends the Cartesian position, as
Malebranche did, by proposing the theory of
"occasionalism":
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To work properly it [the Cartesian position]
must assume God's activity in human beings,
correlating bodily events (the flame burns my
hand) with mental states (I feel pain). This
'occasionalism' is admittedly also ad hoc and
mythological, but less so than attributing
earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, disease and
animal pain to demonic activity.2

I thank Peter Harrison for his courteous response.
Overall, it advances the discussion of pain and its
moral significance. Unfortunately for Harrison,
however, his reply succeeds no better than his
original article in justifying his denial of nonhuman
suffering. Space limitations prevent me from
responding in full to him, so I will focus on the key
elements in his reply. I fully agree with his
suggestion that interested readers should draw their
own conclusions by reading his original, unexcerpted
paper as well as our exchange.

In short, on this view the flame which burns the
hand, leading to nerve impulses that eventually reach
the cortex, is not the cause of the pain: God sees to
it that this "nonphysical" experience results. 3
Nonhuman animals are exempt from all such
supernatural promptings. 4
Of course, the burden is on Harrison to make a
case for his position, not on his critics to show his
view to be false. Merely saying that his version of
Descartes' view is a better solution to the problem
of evil than the invocation of demons would hardly
carry the day, as Harrison is well aware. A number
of additional arguments are needed if he is to
demonstrate the plausibility of his view. These
arguments must appeal to premises that are themselves plausible. If there is significant evidence
against those premises, Harrison should at least
acknowledge that evidence. He assuredly should not
appeal to premises that presuppose, in whole or in
part, that his position is true, without attempting to
support those premises or referring us to other authors
who supply such support. Finally, since Harrison's
denial of nonhuman animal pain seems to fly in the
face of the evidence, he should endeavor to provide
us with plausible ways of interpreting nonhuman
animal behavior. If his hypothesis cannot do at least
as good a job as the consciousness hypothesis in
accounting for nonhuman animal behavior, it should
be rejected. In his reply to me, Harrison has attempted
to support some previously unsupported contentions
in his original paper, but, as I shall argue, he has still
not shown his position to be plausible.

Harrison's position
and what he must do to support it
Let us first be as clear as we can about what
Harrison actually claims. We must not forget that
theodicy is his driving motive. Harrison believes that
it is easy to reconcile human pain with the existence
of a perfect God: it is the price of free will and builds
character. Nonhuman suffering, he assumes, cannot
be explained in this way. Rejecting as "ad hoc" the
theodicy proposing that fallen angels rather than God
are responsible for natural evils, including animal
suffering, l Harrison embraces a version of Descartes'
theodicy. According to that view, nonhuman animals
are said to lack awareness of anything, including
stimuli we find to be painful; thus, no experiences of
theirs can be used as ammunition for the problem of
evil. They are mindless bodies; humans are minds
linked to bodies in this life. While accepting
Descartes' conclusion, Harrison partially rejects the
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assume that language is required as evidence of
consciousness, given the well-known problems with
that view? Even Peter Carruthers has avoided that
pitfall. Harrison refers to Wittgensteinian philosopher
Norman Malcolm to support his view, but this is of
little help. According to Malcolm, verbal reports are
the "criterion" (in his words, "something that settles
a question with certainty") of dreaming. In general,
Malcohn holds that claims about mental states must
have publicly observable "criteria" to constitute
their verification; otherwise, such claims are
"nonsense."6 Nonhuman animals do not report
dreams, although they go through all the brain
activity and twitching, etc., that humans do before
waking and reporting dreams. This leads Malcolm
to remark offhandedly that "a dog's dream" has "no
content.,,7 Harrison then generalizes, claiming that
any "meaningful" attribution of mental states to
nonhuman animals cannot mean what we mean
when we attribute such states to other humans: such
terms must refer to purely physical characteristics,
since we have no other criteria for their correct
application. Any talk, then, of "grief," "anxiety,"
"pain," and "choice" pertaining to nonhumans is
properly talk about nonmental states. Anyone
thinking otherwise, Harrison concludes, is guilty of
"linguistic confusion."
This argument does not add to the plausibility of
Harrison's position. It relies entirely upon Malcolm's
version of the philosophically misbegotten and long
since refuted verifiability criterion ofmeaningfulness.
The behavioral sciences have clung to this view long
after its philosophical demise, as Bernard Rollin has
documented, but for some time now they have been
emerging from its spell. Thus, Harrison has not shown
at all that, e.g., ethological research indicating that
nonhuman animals are capable of making some
choices (not "choices"), 8 as well as other such
research, is based on "linguistic confusion." Moreover,
even apart from the familiar fatal flaws of the
verifiability criterion, its use in the context of
Harrison's attack on the argument from analogy is
highly questionable. Harrison simply assumes without
further ado that the behavioral and physiological
similarities between humans and many nonhumans is
not good evidence for consciousness in the latter. This
is tantamount to assuming, without supporting
argumentation, that the argument from analogy is bad:
once again, the question is begged. 9

Mind-body theories
and the charge of linguistic confusion

Harrison's discussion of alternative mind-body
theories is welcome. He correctly says that dualists
believe that a proposition about mental states is
different in meaning and reference (connotation and
denotation) from a proposition about physical states.
I would add that a plausible monistic theory such as
materialism will hold that propositions about mental
states differ in meaning but not reference from certain,
perhaps still undiscovered propositions about physical
states. (We would hardly have been arguing about
mind-body theories for millennia if meaning or
linguistic usage settled the question.) It is also the case
that the argument from analogy to other minds, human
or nonhuman, is compatible with both dualism and
materialism. According to it, certain behavior
(including possible utterances like "I am in excruciating pain at this moment," screaming, writhing,
etc. 5 ), at certain times, in beings physiologically
similar to oneself in relevant ways empirically
warrants the conclusion that these others are also
conscious, however consciousness may be metaphysically construed. In principle, the inference to
nonhuman animal sentience is drawn in the same way
as one's inference that other humans, be they verbal
or pre-verbal, are conscious.
Harrison claims otherwise, saying in his reply that
we can "never" know what a nonhuman animal's
mental states (if any) are, since "their nervous
systems differ from ours in significant ways" and "we
have no independent access to their mental states."
On the first count, however, as Harrison has conceded
with regard to pain, many nonhuman animals share
with humans all the relevantly similar neurological
structures and processes. On the second count, what
does Harrison mean by saying that we have no
"independent access" to any nonhuman animal
mental states? Barring telepathy, it would seem that
we also lack such access to the mental states of other
humans: we must infer such states from their behavior
and the empirical circumstances. For Harrison's
claim to make sense, he must be assuming that verbal
reporting-language-is required for knowledge of
another's mental states. Indeed, he refers to "the
language criterion of consciousness" in his note 12,
and appears to be presupposing it in his discussion
of the concept of dreaming. But why must one
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the subjects were exposed to high levels of stress and
pain-producing stimuli (not just to "stress" and "pain")
indicated that the same abnormalities were present. 15
Contrary to Harrison, we do not find a wild disproportion between physical states and mental states: quite
the opposite. All of these findings, of course, are
compatible with dualistic as well as materialistic
theories of mind and body, and they are thoroughly in
tune with evolutionary theory.
Harrison, however, believes that relating evolutionary theory to the emergence and development of
mental states is utterly unwarranted, because "it is
behaviours, not mental states, which adapt, and it is
only physical entities which can be the subjects of
natural selection." This would come as quite a surprise
to all the evolutionary biologists (Allan Wilson and
Stephen Gould among them) who link natural selection
to the development of intelligence, among many other
mental traits. Harrison's claim, of course, presupposes
that materialism must be false; anyone not already
convinced of this will hardly be impressed. But, most
importantly, even many dualists would find his claim
to be highly misleading at best. However mind or mental
states may be "connected" to the body, dualists hold
that mental and physical states form some sort of unit
during earthly life. What happens to the body is not
unrelated to the mind or one's mental states.
Interactionists have no problem with evolutionary
processes being correlated with mental changes; nor
do epiphenomenalists or double-aspect theorists. Even
parallelists could have no objection to increased
mental complexity accompanying increased nervous
system complexity; "hypophenomenalists" such as
Schopenhauer, who believe that the mind drives the
development of the physical world, would positively
embrace the notion. 16 Only followers of one form of
dualism could unequivocally accept Harrison's claim
that mental states do not change in conjunction with
the physical processes of evolution: occasionaIists. If
God is called upon to see to it that the appropriate mental
states, whatever those are, occur in humans on particular
occasions, we can see why there need be no mental
parallel to the physical world. God is free to fasbion
any miracle that God chooses to fasbion. Clearly,
Harrison, an occasionalist, cannot use this argument to
buttress his own position! The overwhelming evidence
of correlations between "the mental and physical
worlds" gives us independent grounds for rejecting
Harrison's claims.

On the alleged disproportion
between physical and mental worlds
In order to further support his denial of nonhuman
animal consciousness, Harrison claims that there is "no
proportionality betw~en physical and mental worlds."
He notes that even our closest physical relatives,
chimpanzees, who are 98.4% genetically similar to us
and whose brains are so like ours, have not begun to
equal human accomplishments: "There is in the animal
world nothing to compare with the products of the
conscious mind." He dismisses chimpanzees' ability
to carry on simple conversations in sign language: after
all, he observes, these communications would never be
confused with Shakespeare's creations!
Does the fact that nonhuman animals have not
created art works "98.4%" as good as our own show
that there is no correlation between brain development
and mental states, as Harrison would have it? Hardly!
He neglects to consider that modem human brains are
340% larger than chimpanzee brains (chimpanzee and
human body sizes are comparable). The chimpanzee
brain is almost as large as the brain ofAustralopithecus,
the frrst hominid genus (as far as we knoW).lO One
cannot expect Hamlet from a human-sized being with
a 400 g brain (the vast majority of those of us with
1350 g brains could never manage it either).l1 We know
of no Australopithecine Bards either (if there were any,
they failed to record their soliloquies); it does not follow
from this that they were not conscious. In fact, there is
good evidence that these ancient forebears used stone
too1S. 12 Not coincidentally, chimpanzees, who according
to genetic evidence have been diverging from hominids
for about 5 million years, also are known to fashion
and use tools. Contrary to Harrison, the correlation
between relative brain size/structure and evidence of
intelligence is just what one would expect.
Other mental states also have their physical
correlates, including pain. PET scans of humans have
revealed three different areas of the brain that are
operative during painful experiences. 13 Much research
now indicates that higher and lower thresholds of pain
are related to specific neural structures and activity.14
Moreover, autopsies of disease- and drug-free bumans
who had killed themselves after suffering from chronic
pain and depression indicate that they had abnormal
levels of certain brain chemicals as well as abnormalities
in their opiate receptors. Researchers doing this latter
study note that nonhuman animal experiments in which
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Inadequate models of complex nonhuman animal
behavior

I find it a bit odd that an occasionalist, for whom each
human mental state is a miracle wrought by God,
rejects the hypothesis that nonhuman animals are
conscious on the grounds that it is "superfluous."
Surely, Occam's Razor cuts both ways.

If nonhuman animals are indeed not conscious,
how are we to comprehend what they do? In his
original paper, Harrison gives us two explanations of
seemingly purposeful behavior by nonhumans; each,
he thinks, shows the assumption of consciousness to
be superfluous. (1) We know from our own cases that
reflexes allow us to pull back from a flame before the
pain is felt. Thus, the experience of pain is not required
for the appropriate survival-enhancing behavior to
occur (remember, humans get the experience anyway
because it builds character). Harrison immediately
cautions us that he is not claiming that all animal
behavior in circumstances we would find painful is of
this type,17 so we clearly need some further models.
Moreover, the reflex proposal is not even plausible if
we take it in the limited way intended, since it gives
us no way to understand avoidance behavior after a
single exposure to the damaging stimulus. (2) To show
that nonhuman animal learning ("learning?") need not
in principle involve consciousness, Harrison cites the
example of protozoan habituation. Again, as I noted
in my paper, he claims not to be saying that all
nonhuman animal learning is of this kind!8-a wise
claim, given that very little behavior by complex
nonhumans would fit this model. However, one waits
in vain for more plausible models.!9
In his response, Harrison suggests that sociobiological explanations making no reference to mental
states can in principle account for all complex
nonhuman animal behavior. He takes what he claims
to be an example of mine: a nonhuman's refusal to eat
after the death of a companion. The surviving member
of a "superannuated breeding pair," he proposes, is
now past breeding; fasting would free resources for
use by younger conspecifics. Genes, then, would be
sufficient to explain "grieving" behavior. This
proposal, of course, cannot account for similar
behavior by younger nonhumans at the death of
companions who are not even members of their own
species. Harrison guards against such criticisms by
saying that it really does not matter if his particular
account here works out: the important thing is that
some such account is always possible. Nonetheless,
the fact remains that we have still not been given a
single plausible nonmentalistic account of complex
nonhuman animal behavior. 2o I cannot help adding that
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Drawing some ethical conclusions
I conclude my response to Harrison by taking up
the issue with which he began his reply to me: the
ethical implications, if any, of his denial of nonhuman
animal consciousness. Harrison, of course, cautions
us at the end of his original article that he is not urging
us to beat "our infants and pets."2! He apparently
follows Aquinas and Kant in holding that such
treatment might encourage the mistreatment of
humans. I will not here repeat the familiar criticisms
of such reasoning. 22 Contrary to Harrison's claim,
there is historical evidence that Descartes' machine
model of nonhumans encouraged vivisection (is it
coincidental that Descartes himself engaged in the
practice?).23 Later practitioners of vivisection who saw
no need to use anesthesia, such as Claude Bernard,
were clearly quite taken by the machine model and
convinced they were not wronging their victims, just
as the Port Royal Cartesians of Descartes' own century
were. It is fascinating that Harrison uses the term
cruelty in his discussion of the Port Royal horrors,
and speaks of some Cartesians' advocacy of kindness
to nonhuman animals. What sense can such terms, used
by Harrison without quote marks this time, make?
Could it be that Harrison cannot quite bring himself
to believe his own view?
Unlike Harrison, Carruthers straightforwardly draws
the ethical implications of their shared position, finding
it "morally objectionable" to be concerned about
"nonexistent" cruelty on factory farms or in laboratories
when conscious humans benefit from the products of
such activities. Perhaps readers will recall that
Carruthers declares it a "moral imperative" to stop
feeling sympathy fornonhuman animals. lfnonhumans
are unconscious, and we can benefit from trapping,
vivisecting, and killing them, we ought to do exactly
that, pausing only to educate the gullible public about
the impossibility of being "cruel" to nonhuman animals.
In one sentence near the end of his original article,
Harrison suggests that he is willing to consider adopting
such a position: "Such causes as animal liberation may
have to be rethought."24
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our earliest stages of development that our awareness is most
like that of the higher animals ... [t]he force of these examples
should now be apparent. The 'awareness' of animals is like
that of the sleeping Jones, the amnesiaesthetized patient, the
neonate" (p. 90; emphasis mine). I cannot see how we can
interpret this section as Harrison now says: it stresses the
similarity of certain human and nonhuman animal experiences
rather than their dissimilarity. I nonetheless welcome
Harrison's current clarification of his position.

On the contrary, such positions as Hanison's and
Carruthers' should be rethought. In the absence of a
strong case for the denial of nonhuman animal
consciousness, we are obligated to take moral note of
nonhuman animal suffering, as well as the suffering of
humans who are too .young or too ill-equipped to rival
Shakespeare.
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S Current communication theory indicates that communication is, to a large extent, rwnverbal. In fact, many theorists
believe that speech, when it is present, constitutes less than
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Human Interaction, Third Edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
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3 It is ironic that the problem of evil is allegedly being
solved by having the Almighty be the direct cause of
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theological baggage may think that Harrison's position
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anthology on animal issues have done the job for us,
reprinting Harrison's article with all theological references
neatly excised (Robert Baird and Stuart Rosenbaum, eds.,
Animal Experimentation: The Moral Issues (Buffalo, N.Y.:
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Harrison). See also his essay, "Knowledge of Other Minds,"
pp. 365-76, in the same volume. On p. 366, Malcolm makes it
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7 Malcolm, "The Concept of Dreaming," op. cit., p. 272.
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being ("Knowledge of Other Minds," op. cit., p. 369).
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not go quite so far.

4 Harrison's reply makes it unequivocally clear that he
denies animals have pain of any kind. In the last section of
his original paper, he appeared to be claiming (inconsistently)
that neonates and nonhuman animals experience pain but lack
the psychological continuity of consciousness allegedly
required to render such an occurrence significant. He now
says that he was not attributing painful experiences, however
"insignificant," to nonhuman animals. Although he claims
that the context of his discussion made it clear that his
references to painful experiences that hun, although they may
be forgotten, were references to human experience only, a rereading of this section of his paper does not bear out his selfinterpretation. His assertions about the "discomfort" and the
"many painful experiences" babies have (experiences of little
account, supposedly, without a robust sense of self) come in
the context of an entire section that emphasizes the
insignificance of forgotten but real suffering. IIi fact, he
concludes his discussion of neonatal pain experiences by
stating that "[t]his last example is crucial, because it is during
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consistently activating tape recordings of their mothers' voices
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Allan Wilson notes that birds and mammals are in tum much
bigger-brained in relation to body size than less complex
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